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This paper investigates two different approaches to the analysis 
of institutions using game theory and discusses their 
methodological and theoretical implications for further 
research. Starting from von Neumann and Morgenstern’s theory, we 
investigate, how Schotter and Schelling’s approaches to the 
analysis of economic institutions contribute to develop a proper 
cognitive method to investigate institutions as the unplanned 
outcome of self- interested individual behavior? While the game 
theory model developed by Schotter does not allow to encompass 
the complexity of decision-making processes leading to the 
emergence of institutions, Schelling’s empirical approach 
contributes to the cognitive inquiry into economic institutions 
and it opens the way to an interdisciplinary research method in 
which pure theory, empirical research and insight coming from 
different research fields work together. Starting form 
Schelling’s work it is possible to draw the progress achieved by 
the cognitive economics of institutions and to suggest the need 
of further experimental and empirical research to better 
understand the cognitive dynamics that shape human behavior and 
influence the emergence of economic institutions. 
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From its first applications in economics, the 
popularity of game theory has risen and fallen in 
almost cyclical fashion. The first edition of Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern’ s book The Theory 
of Game and Economic Behavior (1944) aroused 
the initial excitement. By the late 1950s game 
theory has been applied in many areas of 
economic research with varying degrees of 
success, from oligopoly and price formation 
processes (Shubik, 1959; Gilles, 1959) to 
bargaining problems, resource allocation issues 
and the analysis of social institutions. 
At the beginning of the 1970s, authors like 
Shubik (1971-72) and Hurwicz (1973, 1975) 
focused on the role of social institutions and 
investigated their impact on economic processes. 
In this literature, institutions are presented as 
fixed settings in which the rules of conduct that 
agents can follow in playing the game are well 
defined. On the basis of this approach, game 
theory has been applied to the study of individual 
behavior in different institutional settings, and it 
enables economists to analyze the comparative 
properties of alternative institutions. 
However, this tool has also been applied to 
investigate the emergence of institutional 
arrangements in a given physical situation or 
game. In such contexts, social institutions are not 
part of the rules of the game but are the 
outcomes of player’ s interactions (Ambrosino, 
2006).  
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The concept of institutions corresponding to 
this approach is consistent with Menger’ s (1883) 
and Hayek’ s (1962, 1967b, 1988a) theories, 
that considered institutions to be the unplanned 
outcomes of social interactions taking place 
among self-interested economic agents. From 
this point of view, institutions are the framework 
in that individuals are able to coordinate their 
behavior. Moreover, Hayek’ s theory of the 
emergence of institutions is closely connected 
with his theory of mind; the sensory order and the 
spontaneous order of society are strictly and 
reciprocally linked (Rizzello, 1997; Caldwell, 
2003; Ambrosino, 2006).  
Institutions as outcomes of social interaction 
were one of the economic issues that Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern had in mind when 
they began their analysis (Schotter and 
Schwodiauer, 1980). They suggested that theory 
should start by describing agents in a “ state of 
nature”  from which the theory will predict what 
standard of behavior will evolve. Institutions 
(called “ standards of behavior” ) emerge as the 
set of possible equilibrium outcomes of a game 
of strategy.  
After von Neuman and Morgenstern, the inquiry 
on the emergence of institutional arrangements 
has been developed in two main directions. On 
the one hand there is Schotter’ s research line, 
which applies formal game theory models to 
analyze the emergence of institutions. On the 
other hand Schelling’ s theoretical and empirical 
research approach investigates the emergence of 
social rules of behavior. Both these approaches 
are consistent with Hayek’ s definition of 
institutions as the unplanned results of human 
interaction.  
This paper argues that the different research 
methods applied as well as the different way in 
that the two authors acknowledge von Neumann 
and Morgestern’ s idea of coalition, bring 
Schotter and Schelling to different explanations of 
the institutions emergence processes. Moreover, 
it will be argued that better chances to develop 
such kind of inquiry will be offered by an 
interdisciplinary approach (cognitive-
experimental) in which pure theory, empirical 
research and insight coming from different 
research fields work together.   
This paper is organized into five sections. 
Section I describes Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern’ s main contribution to game 
theoretical inquiry into social institutions. Section 
II deals with Schotter’ s analysis. Section III 
points out some distinctive features of 
Schelling’ s approach. Section IV discusses 
similarities and differences between Schotter’ s 
and Schelling’ s approaches and investigates 
how their theories fit with Hayek's theory of 
institutions. Section V makes some concluding 
remarks on the promising insights into the 
institution-creation process afforded by 
developing Schelling’ s research method. 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern’ s Theory of 
Games and the Emergence of Economic 
Institutions 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern’ s Theory of 
Games and Economic Behavior was intended to 
develop a theory of individual behavior “ based 
on a careful analysis of the ordinary every day 
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interpretation of economic facts”  (von Neumann 
and Morgenstern, 1944: 7).  
Nevertheless, the institutional question almost 
naturally arises from von Neumann and 
Morgenstern’ s work (Hurwicz, 1945; Schotter, 
1992)
1
. In fact, because the theory of games with 
more than two players makes it possible to define 
the set of mutually exclusive social behaviors by 
introducing the concept of coalition, it can be 
considered a tool with which to outline what 
institutional arrangements –  or, in the authors’  
words, what “ orders of society”  –  may emerge 
from a given social situation. 
This paper considers two main aspects of von 
Neumann and Morgenstern’ s theory. First, the 
emergence of coalitions in n-person games and 
the concept of solution as a set of imputations. 
Second, the implications of admitting 
indeterminacy into n-player games. 
When using game theory to investigate the 
emergence of institutions, it is important to focus 
on three or n-person games. Three-person 
games do not correspond to any particular 
economic problem, but they allow description of 
the multiplicity distinctive of human relations. 
These are the interactions in which coalitions can 
be profitably formed (von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1944).  
The simplest constant-sum game which 
admits to coalition formation has three 
participants (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
1944). Games of this kind imply that any two 
players can combine. While any possible 
combination is in process, each of the players 
must bear in mind that his likely partner may 
leave the coalition and join the third participant 
(von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). What a 
player can obtain from a certain coalition 
depends on both the rules of the game and the 
other feasible coalitions.  Even, if the rules of the 
game are inviolable, players may improve an 
alliance by paying a compensation whose amount 
depends on what each player can get from the 
other possible alternative coalitions (von 
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). 
A coalition in a zero-sum game implies that 
the two allies get exactly what the excluded party 
loses. The purpose of the theory is not to predict 
which coalition will form. Rather, the theory points 
out that it would be irrational if no coalition was 
formed. A consistent theory of  three-person 
zero-sum games will result from looking for 
solutions that are not single imputations, but 
rather a system of imputations (von Neumann 
and Morgenstern, 1944: 36), where an imputation 
is a given distribution of gains among the players.  
A set of imputations is a solution if each 
imputation included in the set is not dominated by 
the others and every imputation in the set 
dominates some solutions outside the set. 
Hence a solution is not defined with the 
attributes of existence and uniqueness; rather, it 
is defined a property of the set that characterizes 
all possible solutions. 
When the concept of solution has been 
described, the analogy between institutions or 
standards of behavior and the described set of 
imputations arises. 
Von Neumann  and  Morgenstern suggest  that  
                                                                                          
1   See Morgenstern & Schwödiauer (1976). 
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the set of imputations S which we are considering 
corresponds to “ standard of behavior”  (von 
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944: 41) connected 
with a social organization. Given a particular 
social context, individuals are able to adjust 
themselves, according to traditions and 
experience, to that context. To do so, they set up 
a variety of alternatives “ which will probably all 
express some general principles but nevertheless 
differ among themselves in many particular 
respects”  (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
1944: 41). In terms of social organizations, the 
concept of solution that they develop explains the 
emergence of accepted standards of behavior. 
Solutions as described above, in fact, both have 
the inner stability that the establishment of social 
institutions requires and allow for a multiplicity of 
solutions. 
The inner stability of a solution as a set of 
imputations is expressed by the described 
peculiar property of imputations.    
If the set of imputations can be considered as 
a standard of behavior, then it has the properties 
of the solution state: no inner contradiction and 
any non-conforming behavior must be 
discredited.  
The second main aspect of von Neumann and 
Morgenstern’ s theory is the importance that it 
gives to indeterminacy.  
Their concept of solution does not imply 
uniqueness. Rather, von Neumann and 
Morgenstern’ s theory admits to a multiplicity of 
solutions, and it allows for certain degrees of 
indeterminacy. Indeterminacy and inner stability 
are not contradictory features.  
There is indeterminacy because many different 
solutions or standards of behavior may emerge 
from given rules of the game or social contexts. 
Yet each one of them will have the property of a 
solution and hence will be characterized by inner 
stability. 
Indeterminacy is not a weakness in von 
Neumann and Morgenstern’ s theory.  
Morgenstern states that indeterminacy is not 
something to run from but rather to embrace. The 
world is uncertain and social situations are 
interesting only because they contain 
indeterminacies (Schotter, 1992: 107). In the 
words of Shubik, Von Neumann was even more 
committed than Morgenstern to the idea of a 
solution as a set of imputations (Shubik, 1992).  
 Von Neumann and Morgenstern’ s concept of 
institution seems consistent with Menger’ s 
theory and with some main aspects of Hayek’ s.  
This theory implicitly claims that institutions may 
be the unplanned outcomes of social interaction 
and that they are characterized by a high level of 
indeterminacy and by inner stability. 
Schotter’ s Theory of Social Institutions: A Formal 
Approach for an Evolutionary Theory 
Between the end of the 1970s and the beginning 
of the 1980s, Schotter applied game theory to 
develop his theory of institutions (Berman and 
Schotter, 1979, 1980; Schotter, 1981). Schotter 
received his training in game theory under the 
supervision of one of its founders i.e. Oskar 
Morgenstern. He considers institutions to be 
properties of the equilibrium of games, and not 
properties of the game description (Schotter, 
1981).   
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Schotter (1981: 1) examines the nature, 
evolution and function of social and economic 
institutions. His purpose is to achieve a positive 
theory able to describe the type of institutional 
arrangements that can evolve from a given 
situation
2
. 
Schotter's theory is intended to be a first step 
in liberating economics from its fixation with 
competitive markets as all-encompassing 
institutional frameworks (Schotter, 1981: 1) 3 . 
Schotter takes von Neumann and Morgenstern’ s 
static analysis a step forward. He considers the 
institutional issue as an evolutionary one. The 
analysis of institutions must bear in mind that 
agents have finite lives, and that their successors 
inherit a variety of social rules, conventions, 
institutions and norms that enable the easier 
coordination of social and economic activities. 
Hence Schotter calls his game theoretical 
approach “ evolutionary”
4
 rather than 
“ dynamic”
5
.  
This choice is strictly correlated to the way in 
which Schotter interprets the concept and role of 
institutions. He refers to Menger's “ organic”  
theory of institutions, which seeks to explain how 
institutions –  that enable the coordination of 
social interactions and are necessary for common 
welfare –  arise spontaneously from the self-
interested and selfish interactions of economic 
agents. Furthermore, Schotter's inquiry is 
                                                        
2    Contrary to Hurwicz (1973, 1975). 
3    Schotter recalls Morgenstern (1941,1963, 1972). 
4   Sudgen(1986); Young (1991, 1993), Milgrom, North, 
and Weingast (1990); Greif (1989, 1994); Blowes 
(2000); Aoki (2001). 
5   Evolutionary game thoery originated in biology 
Lewontin (1961); Maynard Smith (1972); Maynard 
Smith’s work was followed by Axelrod (1984).  
enriched by Hayek’ s theory (1945) that concerns 
itself with the unplanned or unconscious 
interaction of social agents in order to investigate 
the spontaneous or unintended social institutions 
they create (Schotter, 1981). Schotter (1981: 21) 
believes that Hayek’ s types of problems 
demand a theoretical explanation that can be 
answered through the use of what we are calling 
a “ state of nature method ” 6. 
In embracing Hayek’ s theory, Schotter neither 
mentions nor analyzes the role of individual 
cognitive processes in determining the routine of 
behavior that the Viennese economist considered 
crucial in the emergence of institutions (Rizzello, 
1997; Rizzello and Turvani, 2000, 2001; 
Ambrosino, 2006). 
The central thesis of Schotter’ s book is that 
institutions emerge in response to a set of 
recurrent problems. He states that no economic 
theory of institution creation can be deterministic, 
nor can it give unique predictions of the exact 
institutional form that will emerge. As von 
Neumann and Morgenstern describe that all the 
social interactions of interest may lead to many 
possible equilibrium solutions. Schotter argues 
that his theory is able to eliminate this 
indeterminacy and predict which equilibrium 
social institution will actually be settled upon
7
. By 
applying an evolutionary game theory approach, 
he supersedes von Neumann and Morgenstern’ s 
                                                        
6   In Hayek the evolution of institutions is a cultural 
process (Hayek, 1988, Caldewell, 2004)  
7   The non-cooperative part of the book exludes the 
concept of indeterminacy.  Societies in the real world  
select one mode of bhevior to solve recurrent 
problems, so that a deterministic thory is possible. 
Indeterminacy is important in cross cultural analysis 
(Schotter, 2007).  
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idea of the desirability of indeterminacy. Schotter 
had in mind a theory based on repeated games. 
In this games it is assumed that when a player 
dies he is replaced by his offspring and that each 
player can transfer his accumulated knowledge to 
his children. This means that each new 
generation will be informed of the particular 
institution (payoff) chosen by their parents. It is 
likely that this knowledge will affect the solution in 
the next period game. In Schotter’ s words 
“ arbitrary arrangements may become fossilized 
in the economy and these arrangements become 
parameters or permanent features of the society 
as it continues to evolve. Consequently, many 
generations later, a payoff/institution pair may 
exist that govern this game or situation, without 
being obvious why that particular pair is chosen”  
(Schotter, 1981: 14). It becomes clear that a 
stable institutional arrangement depends closely 
on the history of how the game has been played. 
In Schotter’ s model, indeterminacy is 
resolved by modeling the emergence of 
institutions as a stochastic process in which the 
equilibrium determines the state in which the 
expectations of all the players are such that they 
all expect the others to behave in a particular 
manner with probability equal to one; and that is 
exactly what they will see happen (Schotter, 
1981). 
Before setting out his mathematical model, 
Schotter describes four basic problems 
representing the main types of social-interaction 
difficulties for which economic institutions may 
arise as solutions: coordination problems, 
problems of prisoners’  dilemma type, 
inequality-preserving problems and some cases 
of the cooperative game type. Basically, Schotter 
argues that the interactions from which 
institutions arise organically, as the result of 
individual action and not of collective behavior, 
must be described with games played non-
cooperatively or without communication among 
players. Indeed, in these kinds of games, rules of 
behavior emerge as the outcome of self-
interested human action, not by human design. 
Otherwise, there are other types of interaction in 
which institutions are created by the explicit 
human design of a social planner or result from 
an explicit social bargaining process. The case of 
institutions settled by a social planner is not 
interesting from Schotter’ s point of view
8
. In 
fact, again referring to Hayek (1945), he 
emphasizes that this case can easily be 
described by maximizing some objective function 
of the social planner. Moreover, even assuming 
that the problem of the emergence of institutions 
could be solved straightforwardly, it would be only 
a partial explanation of a wider problem.    
Also all those social states in which agent’ s 
interactions can be described as bargaining 
processes are of relatively no interest. These 
cases need a theory of bargaining to describe the 
process through which agents can explicitly agree 
on the institutions they want to be governed by.  
Schotter admits the existence of social 
interaction equivalent to cooperative n-person 
games from which institutions emerge 
organically. But these cases are residual in his 
inquiry. He refers to problems of prisoners’  
dilemma type, and he does not analyze either 
                                                        
8   Contrary to Shubik and Shaplley (1977) and Hurwicz 
(1973). 
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inequality-preserving problems (which belong to 
the coordination problems) or cooperative 
problems. The only case he quoted was  
Nozick’ s example on the emergence of the state 
from a state-of-nature.  Schotter focuses on 
Nozick’ s theory of the rise of the minimal state 
(Nozick, 1975) only to stress the merits of the 
state-of-nature approach. Yet Schotter 
underlines that the cooperative problem settled by 
Nozick shows interesting aspect in an institutional 
perspective, nevertheless, in his inquiry he does 
not consider cooperative n person games further. 
This particular methodological choice is explained 
by Schotter’ s belief that non-cooperative games 
are those that best describe the unplanned 
interactions among players from which institutions 
emerge. Furthermore, far from considering 
cooperative game theory as an unprofitable 
approach to institution creation processes, 
Schotter chooses instead to focus on non-
cooperative games because the manner in which 
cooperative game theory has been developed 
since von Neumann and Morgenstern has proved 
disappointing. Its failure has been due to the 
misplaced emphasis that has characterized the 
application of this theory to the problem of 
general equilibrium. Analysis of this kind 
concentrates wholly on the core solution concept, 
which explains the evolution of competitive 
markets but does not explain the evolution of any 
other institution. Schotter’ s theory disregards the 
important opportunities offered by cooperative 
game theory to move beyond the neoclassical 
model by allowing agents unlimited strategic 
freedom within the rules of the game. This 
freedom takes the form of processes of 
coalition-formation among players and is an 
important theoretical concept with which to 
explain the evolution of social institutions as 
endogenous processes (Schotter, 1981). 
After this preliminary discussion Schotter 
develops his formal theory of institutions. This 
theory is divided into two parts (the first presents 
the model in the two-person prisoner’ s dilemma 
case, the second generalizes the discussion), 
and it is based on analysis of the super-games 
equilibrium convention. The aim is to develop a 
formal evolutionary game theory of institutions in 
which successive generations of players are 
involved in solving the same recurrent problem. 
Schotter technically frames the problem as a 
super-game (constituent game), that is obtained 
by infinitely iterating a static game. In this super-
game, the players are aware that they will interact 
with each other for an infinite number of time 
periods, and that they must evaluate this fact in 
deciding how to behave. The players must 
recognize “ the fact that the actions they take 
today are bound to influence the expectations 
that the other player will have about them in the 
future and hence the other player's future 
behavior”  (Schotter, 1981: 56). As time passes, 
the players tacitly learn what kind of behavior they 
can expect from the others. If this behavior is an 
equilibrium and becomes a convention among 
the players, it prescribes how agents should 
behave in each later interaction of the same type. 
In the two-person recurrent prisoner's dilemma 
game, Schotter describes how it is possible to 
predict the exact equilibrium convention by 
representing it as a stochastic event. Generalizing 
the model to analyze n-person games, Schotter 
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formally demonstrates that, through a Markovian 
diffusion process, it is possible to determine how 
long does it take to a given social group to 
establish a particular social convention as a guide 
for its behavior which enables agents to solve the 
particular recurrent economic problem that they 
face. Schotter’ s model of institutions creation 
fulfils the aim of his inquiry because it both 
investigates institutions as organically generated 
and makes it possible to eliminate indeterminacy 
in predicting which particular institutions will 
emerge. 
However, the stringent assumptions (players’  
rational behavior, problems of non-cooperative 
prisoner's dilemma type) necessary to achieve 
this goal force Schotter to almost entirely omit 
those aspects of the institution-creation 
processes related to individual cognition (learning 
processes, routine development), although he 
acknowledges their importance.  
As in Hayek (1945), institutions perform an 
essential informative function. They “ codify 
memory” , so that the social interactions 
described by the game of imperfect recall can be 
transformed into games of institution-assigned 
perfect recall (Schotter, 1981: 109). Moreover, 
the informative function of institutions is strictly 
linked to the history of the game. That suggests 
the importance of both the individual cognitive 
process in classifying information and of the 
cultural context in assigning a particular meaning 
to information. 
Schotter's idea of the emergence of 
institutions as an endogenous process implies a 
learning process that enables player to foresee 
each other's behavior. Learning is reduced in the 
formal model to a stochastic process. In the last 
chapter of the book, however, Schotter questions 
the relevance of the biogenetic individual structure 
to institutions-creation dynamics. His main 
contention is that standards of behavior emerge 
to help agents solve recurrent economic 
problems. If the social group adheres to them, 
then those standards of behavior form the basis 
for Schotter's definition of institutions. The 
question Schotter raises is very simply stated. 
There could be pre-existing innate biases or 
cognitive processes that make a certain solution 
to a recurrent interaction problem more natural 
than others and that thus influence the probability 
that exactly that solution will arise (Schotter, 
1981).  
He suggests two possible explanations for the 
importance of such individual predispositions. 
First, Laughlin and d’ Aquili (1974) suggest that 
there may be standards of behavior more 
consistent with basic biogenetic structures which 
exist in the human mind and that have possibly 
evolved because social coordination is essential 
for successful social existence and reproduction, 
and these patterns or structures facilitate such 
coordination and hence increase the fitness of 
human beings possessing them (Schotter, 1981). 
Secondly, Schelling's The Strategy of Conflict 
(1960) suggests that the solution to the 
interdependent decision problems, based on the 
concept of salience, introduces the role of 
cultural background in coordinating individual 
behavior (Schotter, 1981). 
Schotter’ s awareness of the complexity of the 
institutions-creation processes is even more 
evident in his later inquiries. After the 1980s his 
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interest gradually moved from pure theory to an 
experimental approach (Schotter, 2007). 
In the last ten years his research interest has 
returned to institutions. His aim is now to 
investigate experimentally how each generation of 
agents can influence its successor’ s behavior so 
that social conventions appear to emerge over 
time and are passed from generation to 
generation. Social learning plays a crucial role in 
this process (Merlo and Schotter, 1999, 2003; 
Schotter, 2003; Schotter and Sopher, 2003).   
Schotter’ s experimental research on the 
learning processes that give rise to social 
conventions seems consistent with his previous 
work. These empirical studies better encompass 
the complexity of the decision-making and 
institution-creation processes, and they are more 
consistent with Schotter’ s (1981) observations 
on Schelling’ s empirical inquiry. 
Schelling's Contribution: An Empirical Approach to 
Complex Interaction Processes 
In the years immediately following von Neumann 
and Morgenstern's book (1944), Thomas 
Schelling became interested in game theory. 
From the outset, he has taken a quite distinctive 
approach to game theory
9
. Fascinated by the 
complexity of social issues, Schelling finds game 
theory a useful tool with which to investigate that 
complexity and to understand reality (Dodge, 
2006). Throughout his career, his research 
approach has been characterized by a 
combination of empirical and theoretical inquiries 
(Schelling, 1960, 1984, 2006).  
Schelling’ s work is not directly aimed at 
investigating the role and the rise of     
institutions. However, his entire inquiry is based 
on the study of decision processes characterized 
by the interdependence of player’ s choices
 
(Schelling, 1960, 1961, 1978, 2006). All the 
problems of interest to economics and social 
science involve interaction processes in which 
agents must understand each other. They must 
identify standards of behavior that make each 
player’ s action predictable by the others; they 
must jointly develop shared behavior regularities, 
or conventions. 
The solution of economic and social problems 
requires complex interaction processes. The 
institutional issue is almost implicitly involved in 
Schelling’ s inquiries. The processes of 
interaction described by Schelling suggest that 
there may be interesting links between them and 
those interactions that lead to the emergence of 
institutions outlined in Hayek’ s theory 
(Ambrosino, 2006). 
 Schelling (1960, 1978) applies what he refers 
to as a less restrictive and formalized definition of 
game theory to investigate individual interaction 
processes.  
Game theory –  defined as the study of how 
rational agents choose when the best choice 
between two or more possible alternatives 
depends on the choices that others have to make 
–  is the framework in which many types of 
situations can be analyzed (Schelling, 1960, 
2006). Schelling suggests that such a framework 
may be even more helpful if two assumptions 
connoting the game theory approach are 
considered  as  starting  point,  first,  players  are  
                                                                                          
9   Dodge (2006); Schelling (2005). 
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perfectly rational, and second, people only care 
about outcomes. Methods and models must be 
adjusted when their assumptions are not valid to 
explain the complexity of particular cases 
(Schelling, in Dodge, 2006; Ambrosino and 
Biancone, 2013). 
Schelling does not reject the concepts of 
indeterminacy and coalitions developed by von 
Neumann and Morgenstern.  
The Strategy of Conflict (1960) is an inquiry 
into the strategy of international affairs that leads 
to a systematic analysis of interdependent 
decisions processes. Schelling’ s main 
contention is that almost all the circumstances in 
which agents interact are characterized by 
different degrees of conflict. Pure conflict and 
pure collaborative interactions are extreme cases, 
but almost all interactions among players involve 
some level of both conflict and common 
interest
10
. This means that when dealing with an 
interdependent decision problem, each player 
must consider that his choice is dependent on the 
other player’ s action.  
Schelling’ s emphasis on the simultaneous 
existence of different degrees of conflict and 
cooperation suggests that his conception of 
interaction is quite similar to von Neumann and 
Morgenstern’ s. These authors do not distinguish 
between cooperative and non-cooperative 
games. Rather, they argue that zero-sum games 
are the only cases of real conflict, while every 
other kind of game comprises some level of 
cooperation and may allow coalitions to form 
(von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). 
                                                        
10   Harsanyi (1964) 
In Schelling’ s analysis, therefore, social 
interactions are interpreted as mutual-
dependence games in which adversaries must 
tacitly or explicitly interpret each other’ s 
behavior. Schelling argues that such games must 
be investigated by re-orienting game theory. 
Neither simple cooperative game theory nor pure 
non-cooperative games models are able entirely 
to handle the complexity of the coexistence of 
conflict and common interest (Schelling, 1958).  
What is needed is a theory that identifies the 
perceptual and suggestive element involved in the 
process producing the player’ s mutually 
consistent expectations, and in which the 
structural elements of the strategic interaction are 
investigated (Schelling, 1960   84). Game 
theory, which began as a theory of protection 
against interaction, becomes in Schelling’ s 
conceptualization of mixed-motive games the 
theory of strategic interaction (Bernard, 1964: 
444).  
Schelling (1960), far from considering the 
results obtained by the theory of the zero-sum 
game as useless, developed his theory of 
bargaining games or mixed-motive games 11 . 
These games better represent those interaction 
situations that, though characterized by some 
degree of conflict, entail mutual dependence as a 
feature of the game, and in which some kind of, 
tacit or explicit, collaboration or mutual 
accommodation is needed to avoid mutual 
disaster (Schelling, 1960).  
Schelling (1960) investigates both explicit and 
tacit bargaining. He starts from interdependent 
decision situations in which communication is 
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denied. These situations are simply described by 
standard game theory as non-cooperative 
games.  He observes that even if players are not 
allowed to communicate with each other, they try 
to think vicariously
12
. The players develop 
composite expectations, and they have to 
perceive mutual expectations intuitively. Mixed 
motive games can better explain the complexity 
of such interactions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When players perform mixed motive games in 
the real world, they are able to solve the problem. 
Moreover, they certainly do conspicuously better 
that any chance methods would have permitted 
(Schelling, 1960). This means that expectations 
can be tacitly and mutually coordinated to 
achieve a solution that does not depend on the 
logical structure of the game, but rather is 
determined by something that is fairly arbitrary 
(Schelling, 1960). Most tacit bargaining situations 
provide some clue for coordinating behavior, 
some focal point for each person's expectation of 
what the other expects him to expect to be 
expected to do (Schelling, 1960). On being 
                                                                                          
11   Schelling, (1958). 
12  Schelling’s vicarious thinking is not of the  “what would I do 
if I ware he?” kind. Players reason together..They predict what 
the other player will do and choose what to do themselves. 
Players are aware that they all are reasoning in the same way 
toward a common solution (Sudgen & Zamorrόn 2006:9). 
mutually recognized as the possible solution, this 
focal point is able to become the key to the 
problem. It does not simply depend on logic; it 
may depend on imagination, analogy, precedent, 
accidental arrangement, symmetry, the aesthetic 
or geometric configuration of the problem, 
casuistic reasoning, and who the parties are and 
what they know about each other
13
 (Schelling, 
1960). The focal point enables the coordination 
of expectations because it embodies 
characteristics of prominence with respect to 
time, place and the players involved in the game, 
and of uniqueness, which prevent it from being 
ambiguous. 
Schelling's discussion of the appearance of a 
focal point to solve tacit pure-coordination 
problems is even more useful when it highlights 
the institutional nature of focal point.  In pure-
coordination games, the players have convergent 
interests. Nevertheless, in these games too, a 
player cannot choose an action without regard to 
the dependence of the outcome on the other 
player’ s choice. The solution of these 
interactions depends on the player’ s ability 
mutually to perceive a focal point.  Schelling 
argues that it is exactly this process that accounts 
for the rise and the stability of institutions.  The 
force of many rules of etiquette and social 
restraint, including some that have been divested 
of their relevance or authority, seems to depend 
on their having become “ solutions”  to a 
coordination game: everyone expects everyone to 
expect everyone to expect observance, so that 
non-observance carries the pain of 
conspicuousness (Schelling, 1960). The 
 I II 
I 10,10 0,0 
ii 0,0 10,10 
Figure.1 Schelling (1960: 342) this is a coordination 
game. It is an example of a strategic interaction in that 
two equilibria are possible, none of that is preferred by 
agents. Schelling argues that in real life agents are able 
to solve problems of this kind successfully. Agents 
coordinate focusing on some clues of context that make 
one particular outcome to be the solution. The 
relevance of such clues is what makes the selected 
solution to become a proper rule of behaviour in 
repeated interactions. 
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institutional nature of the focal point is also due 
to its tendency to become a stable solution for 
recurrent interaction problems. In fact, even if 
Schelling refers to one-shot games, he implicitly 
suggests that most real-world games are played 
repeatedly (Leeson, Coyne and Boettke, 2006).  
Moreover, the focal point arises organically from 
unplanned individual interaction and, like social 
institutions, it shares the scope and the nature of 
what Hayek defines as institutions (Ambrosino, 
2006). In fact, in mixed-motives games each 
player pursues his own interest, but the solution 
of the interaction process is able to become a 
stable rule if the coordination problem is 
repeated
14
. Shelling argues that the concept of 
role, which in sociology refers to the rights, 
obligations, and expected behavior patterns 
associated with a particular social status, 
explicitly involves both the expectations that 
others have about our behavior and the 
expectations we have about how others will 
behave. This allows him to interpret this concept 
as the stable “ convergent expectations”  
solution of a coordination game. A particular role 
evolves in society, like a focal point does in a 
coordination game, because it is the only 
possible one that players in the specific 
circumstances can identify by a tacit interaction 
process (Schelling, 1960). 
The main feature of the focal point makes it 
evident that indeterminacy is an important aspect 
of the theory of interdependent decisions.  Focal 
                                                                                          
13   Sudgen and Zamarron (2006). 
14  Players in Schelling act according to their own interest but 
they are not necessarily selfish. This difference between 
self-interest and selfishness is also relevant in Hayek’s 
theory  (Hayek , 1967). 
points, like institutions, are not predictable. Every 
mixed-motive game may have more than one 
solution, each of them preferable for the players 
to no solution at all. A focal point arises where 
there is a multitude of equilibria. Which solution, 
which focal point, will be chosen in a given 
situation depends on the specific features of the 
game and of the players involved in it. 
The analysis of tacit bargaining problems 
provides Schelling with the analytical model 
necessary also to comprehend the more general 
case of explicit interaction problems. This is 
firstly, because the psychic process of mutual 
perception, that has an important part in tacit 
cases, plays the important role of expectations 
coordination also in the analysis of explicit 
bargaining, and secondly because most explicit 
game situations also involve a tacit dynamic 
process of mutual accommodation that makes 
them different from pure communication 
culminating in crystallized agreement (Schelling, 
1960). 
Also when communication is allowed, the 
outcome of a bargaining process depends on the 
specific situation, on how the problem is 
formulated, on the analogies and precedents it 
calls to mind and on the data available to solve 
the question. Schelling argues that also explicit 
mixed-motives games require some coordination 
of the participant’ s expectations. He suggests 
that tacit and explicit bargaining are not separate 
concepts. Games have different gradations of 
communication, from tacit interaction to various 
degrees of communication incompleteness. In 
each case, the participants must pay attention to 
the “ communication”  comprised in the 
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inanimate details of the situation (Schelling, 
1960). This does not mean that the same 
interaction problem in explicit and tacit versions 
will have exactly the same solution. Rather, it 
means that the focal point may be very different 
when communication is allowed, for what may be 
important in tacit bargaining because it has the 
features of prominence and uniqueness may not 
be as important in explicit interaction (Schelling, 
1960). 
The institutional nature of the focal point in not 
strictly tacit social interaction stems from the 
same consideration that Schelling makes when 
analyzing coordination problems.  Moreover, the 
existence of precedents has a great influence 
which often exceeds the logical importance of 
other solutions (Schelling, 1960). This indicates 
that also in explicit bargaining the focal point 
which emerges as the solution to a specific 
problem is able to stabilize itself into a 
consolidated rule.  
There is one more reason for focusing on 
Schelling’ s arguments on explicit bargaining. 
These games are of the same kind as those 
which game theory terms cooperative games. 
When cooperative games involve more than two 
players, von Neumann and Morgenstern point out 
that coalitions among players may arise. 
It seems from the previous discussion that 
Schelling does not exclude coalition formation in 
either explicit or tacit bargaining.  
The theory of focal points refers to the ability 
of agents to coordinate their expectations with 
respect to the particular features of the situation. 
This suggests that if the interaction problem 
involves more that two players and if clues that 
the context offers focus the player’ s attention on 
the usefulness of a coalition, that coalition is 
better also for the excluded player in all those 
interdependent decision problems in which finding 
a solution is better than no agreement at all. 
Because the dynamics leading players to a 
particular focal point are even more important in 
tacit interaction, this indicates that n-person tacit 
games may involve mutual perception processes 
based on psychological factors which induce 
players to form coalitions to solve the problem.  
Schelling’ s model of social interaction 
introduces psychological factors as the very 
essence of the problem and describes players as 
no longer accepting the payoff matrix as fixed 
(Bernard, 1954). It defines players as trying to 
change their opponent’ s payoff and their 
tactics.  Schelling argues that in so complex a 
social interaction the object of each player’ s 
strategy is no longer to make the best of the 
situation but to “ manipulate”  the opponent to 
change the situation (Bernard, 1954). Agents will 
use strategies to form coalitions whenever they 
can lead them to a solution. The emergence of 
possible coalitions does not imply that the 
outcome of the game can be considered 
predetermined or planned by the agents. Each 
player’ s strategy is aimed at finding a common 
solution, which is better than no solution at all. 
What solution emerges from the interaction is a 
consequence of the dynamics and the features of 
the game, and of the agent’ s psychological 
characteristics. 
The ability of players to coordinate their 
behavior in situations in which their interests are 
totally or partially opposed, and in which 
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communication is partially permitted, indicates 
that the existence of focal points enables players 
to transform a worst situation into a better one in 
which partial cooperation is possible (Leeson et 
al., 2006). But it does not mean that it is possible 
to predict which focal point will be the solution or 
that the solution will be planned by the players.  
The importance and complexity of mutual 
perception processes, and the difference 
between self-interest and the unplanned outcome 
that players actually achieve in their interaction, is 
well emphasized in Schelling’ s Micromotives 
and Macrobehavior (1978). In this book Schelling 
investigates the relationship between individual’ s 
behavior characteristics and the characteristics of 
the aggregate (Schelling, 1978). In this case, 
too, the field of inquiry is the interdependent 
decision process. Schelling main contention is 
that many social situations are structured so that 
individual players, behaving in a self-interested 
way, may jointly produce an outcome that is 
collectively less than optimal. In many social 
interactions, people’ s behavior depends on how 
many are behaving in a particular way (Schelling, 
1978). The point is that there is a critical mass 
level that once reached makes the process self-
sustaining. In the case of the rise of social norms 
from agent’ s interaction, it may happen that a 
particularly institution becomes hard to change 
even if everyone recognizes that it is inferior to 
many possible others.  
Schelling’ s theory of focal point explains both 
the rise of common solutions to social interaction 
problems and their tendency to become stable 
solutions (proper institutions) to repeated 
interaction problems. Moreover, also the concept 
of critical mass is important in explaining why the 
unplanned outcomes of social interaction may be 
self-reinforcing. In fact, if social institutions are 
the effects of a process in which the critical mass 
mechanism works, then it is exactly this 
mechanism that makes such institutions self-
sustaining and self-reinforcing. Both the 
processes (one generating a focal point, the 
other suggesting that there are forces compelling 
toward convergence in social interaction) can be 
relevant at the same time, even if they may have 
different effects on the institutions-creation 
processes. The focal point allows coordination in 
individual interactions where reaching a solution is 
better than no agreement at all. It may also play 
an important role when interaction takes place 
among a large number of individuals. Schelling 
(1960) argues that the focal point works in n-
person games. The outcome of this interaction is 
not the one that everyone desires. In this sense, 
the focal point may be part of the process that 
makes the critical mass self-sustaining, because 
in so far as individuals mutually perceive that 
solution (even if it is the inferior one) as the focal 
point; they contribute to the self-sustaining 
process that reinforces the normative nature of 
that solution. On the other hand, any change in 
the context or in the mutual perception of the 
players may lead to rejection of a particular 
solution as a focal point. This may trigger a 
change process. 
The two concepts of focal point and critical 
mass in Schelling’ s explanation of the 
institutions-creation process suggest a possible 
explanation for the emergence of institutions as a 
dynamic process in which mutual perception 
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involves logical, psychological and cultural 
factors.  
The way in which the focal point and critical 
mass work highlights that institution-creation 
processes are characterized by indeterminacy, 
and that this cannot be eliminated simply by 
modeling such processes as stochastic events, 
as Schotter suggests. 
How Schotter’ s and Schelling’ s Analysis Fit 
Hayek’ s Theory of Institutions Creation? 
The previous sections argued that both 
Schotter’ s and Schelling’ s concept of 
institution are strongly related to the complexity of 
the processes of social interaction from which 
social norms and institutions emerge. Both 
authors underline the relevance on psychological 
and cognitive determinants in such processes. In 
that their ideas share some relevant aspects of 
Hayek’ s theory of social institutions. 
Hayek's theory of the emergence of institutions 
from social interaction is closely linked to his 
theory of the mind (Rizzello, 1997; Caldwell, 
2003, 2004; Ambrosino, 2006). 
In Hayek (1952), the human mind is the 
framework in which external stimuli are 
associated, through neurobiological perception 
and classification phenomena, with classes of 
actions. Each action is strictly connected with 
perception and depends on individual genetic 
structures and individual past experiences. 
Individuals are heterogeneous and have 
idiosyncratic experiences, which are the reason 
why behavior is not predictable. The result of the 
cognitive process of organization and 
classification of external stimuli is termed the 
sensory order (Hayek, 1952). 
Institutions constitute the framework that 
enables heterogeneous agents to coordinate their 
behavior in a social context characterized by 
uncertainty and only partial information (Hayek, 
1967).  
The spontaneous social order emerging from a 
cultural evolution process and enabling agents to 
select the more profitable institutions to 
coordinate social behavior is the unplanned 
outcome of social interactions in which 
individual’ s actions are the result of such 
complex perception and classification processes. 
Coordination is itself the product of the ability of 
heterogeneous agents to recognize the action 
patterns of other individuals by perceiving their 
own action patterns (Hayek, 1967: 57).  
The spontaneous order is in some respects the 
“ effect”  of the sensory order.  It becomes an 
endless process composed of two main 
elements: first, agents mutually perceive and 
classify their behavior so as to decide their own 
action; second, a multitude of agents with partial 
and idiosyncratic knowledge of the context 
understand how to coordinate (Hayek, 1937, 
1945). 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern’ s theory 
singles out a concept of solution as standard of 
behavior that shares important features with 
Menger’ s and Hayek’ s concept of institutions. 
In particular, von Neumann and Morgenstern’ s 
analysis seems to be consistent with some 
aspects of Hayek’ s concepts of institutions that 
Schotter’ s inquiry does not encompass. 
von Neumann and Morgenstern's concept of 
standards of behavior implicitly shares Hayek's 
definition of institutions as a framework bounding 
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the range of available choices that individuals can 
make and enabling people to coordinate their 
behavior (Hayek, 1967). 
Moreover, their analysis of the standards of 
behavior connected with social organizations 
shows that tradition, experience and social 
context play an important part in making 
individuals adjust their behavior. The standards of 
behavior that enable coordination in social 
interaction are not only characterized by 
indeterminacy; they are linked to experience and 
they may also change. These features of von 
Neumann and Morgenstern’ s solution concept 
recall what Hayek terms spontaneous social 
order.  
This does not signify that von Neumann and 
Morgenstern’ s theory entirely supports 
Hayek’ s. Although the aim of game theory is to 
investigate complex interactions (Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1944: 11), it is based on the 
assumption of the perfect rationality of players. 
Decision-making is an entirely logical process in 
which agents maximize their expected utilities and 
make a probabilistic evaluation of the possible 
solutions. In von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
there is no room for the complexity of the 
cognitive processes that in Hayek’ s theory flank 
the interaction processes leading to institutions 
creation. 
Schotter (1981) explicitly links his inquiry to 
Hayek’ s theory of institution. Yet his formal 
model of institutions-creation forced him to 
exclude not only the cognitive foundations of 
behavior but also some degree of indeterminacy 
in predicting which institution will emerge.  
Schotter's theory encompasses Hayek’ s 
concept of institutions as the outcomes of free 
self-interested interactions and their essential 
informative role (Schotter, 1981). He shares 
Hayek's notions that certain actions become rules 
of behavior (and then proper institutions) through 
iterated interactions, and that the emergence of 
particular institutions is strictly linked with the 
history of the game (Schotter, 1981). But his 
stochastic model is based on strict assumptions 
concerning the player’ s perfect rationality and 
on the non-cooperative nature of the interactions 
that give rise to institutions. Schotter develops a 
formal model able to predict which institution will 
emerge from social interaction. His rejection of 
von Neumann and Morgenstern’ s concept of 
indeterminacy and of their view that social 
interactions basically involve cooperation prevents 
his theory from including certain features of 
Hayek's analysis that he himself pointed out as 
important. 
Although Schotter suggests the importance of 
individual decision processes in social behavior, 
he entirely fails to consider the Hayekian sensory 
order lying beneath the social order. 
If the importance of certain biological and 
cognitive determinants in shaping individual’ s 
behavior is assumed, then different theories are 
needed to explain institution-creation processes 
(Schotter, 1981). Schotter explicitly refers to 
Schelling's The Strategy of Conflict (1960), that 
provides evidence for the existence of “ natural 
solutions”  in coordination problems and explains 
them as the result of similar forms of cultural 
training (Schotter, 1981). Furthermore, Schotter 
argues that in some sense his theory of 
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institutions is compatible with Schelling’ s theory 
of focal point. In fact, he suggests that “ when 
an institution of my type is selected, in order to 
be successful, it has to be a focal point”  
(Schotter, 2007).  
Schelling's theory of interdependent decisions 
corroborates many features of Hayek's theory of 
institutions. 
The focal point is not predictable by a formal 
or mathematical model. Rather, like Hayek's 
institutions, it depends on the specific features of 
the game and on the cultural and cognitive 
characteristics of the players.
15
 As far as a 
certain behavior is socially recognized as a focal 
point, it is able to coordinate social behavior and 
to constitute the social order. When changes in 
the environment or in the perceptual abilities of 
players make them reject this focal point, a new 
process leading to the emergence of a new 
behavioral rule will begin. 
Schelling does not reject the assumption of the 
player’ s perfect rationality. He suggests that 
rationality is not simply constituted by the cold 
logical ability to calculate the best choice to 
make; rather it includes the ability to perceive 
when the solution of an interaction situation 
involves psychological or cultural or even more 
complex aspects of cognition (Schelling, 1960). 
These psychological features must be included in 
the analysis of bargaining processes (Ambrosino 
and Biancone, 2013). 
The theory of interdependent decisions 
addresses the two main problems which, 
according to Hayek, are crucial in the social 
interaction process leading to social order:  
mutual perception of the other’ s behavior, and 
the need for coordinating rules.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What Schelling argues does not mean that his 
theory completely fits with Hayek's theory. 
However, his model of bargaining, because it is 
empirically founded and not formalized and 
allows a certain level of cooperation in almost all 
social interactions, is largely compatible with 
Hayek's theories.    
Schelling's methodological approach releases 
strictly formal models. This suggests that they 
make it impossible to include all those features of 
the game that have an important role in enabling 
players to reach a common solution (Schelling, 
1960). If the cognitive processes in individual 
decision-making are not the problems Schelling 
is determined to analyze, the complexity of such 
problems is something he takes care in 
developing his work. 
                                                                                          
15    See Leeson et al., (2006).  
 I II 
i 9,9 0,0 
ii 0,0 10,10 
Figure 2, Schelling (1960: 341), this is a coordination 
game in that apparently the payoff (II, ii) is better than 
(i, I). Schelling argues that in many real life 
circumstances this matrix describes an interaction in 
that players are more interested in obtaining 9 or 10 
instead of 0 than in obtaining 10 instead of 9. In this 
kind of real interactions the outcome of the games 
depends on some focal point that cannot be determined 
by mathematical models but that depends on some 
specific features of the decision problem. This result 
seems to be coherent with Hayek’s idea of social order. 
In fact, the outcome of this kind of interaction can be 
not the Pareto efficient payoff but the outcome that 
agents perceive as the more appropriate to solve the 
interaction problem. This outcome because it is able to 
coordinate agent’s behaviour can be repeated and can 
become a proper rule of behavior. 
An interdisciplinary approach is important to 
investigate economic institutions considered the 
unplanned outcome of social interaction because it 
allows describing and understanding the peculiarity of 
decision making processes and of human behavior. 
146 
International Journal of Management, Economics and Social Sciences 
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has investigated different approaches 
to the analysis of institutions as the outcomes of 
social interaction. Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern's inquiry as the same of Schotter's 
and Schelling's yields important insights into how 
social interactions give rise to institutions, and 
they are able to corroborate some aspects of 
Hayek's theory. 
Both Schotter and Schelling consider game 
theory to be an important tool for the analysis of 
social institutions as the unplanned outcomes of 
social interaction. Furthermore, Schelling's more 
empirical approach proves to be a better fit with 
Hayek's theory of institutions and the importance 
within it of his theory of mind. 
Particularly the paper suggests that 
Schotter’ s methodological choice, aimed at 
developing an evolutionary mathematical model 
of institutions, forced him to exclude from his 
analysis some aspects that he considers, been 
relevant in the institutions creation processes 
such as von Neumann and Morgenstern's ideas 
of indeterminacy and Hayek’ s role of cognitive 
determinants.  
Schelling’ s methodological choice, on the 
other hand, suggests that Schotter's (1981) 
difficulties in developing a formal model including 
the individual cognitive processes considered by 
Hayek  can be overcome by releasing strictly 
mathematical models, and by moving toward a 
mixture of “ pure”  and “ applied”  research 
(Schelling, 2006), in which there is room for von 
Neumann and Morgenstern's idea of 
indeterminacy. 
Testifying to the profound impact of 
Schelling’ s theories and methodological 
approach on the social sciences, especially on 
game theory and on experimental economics, is 
the large number of citations in academic 
journals and several scientific research projects 
that have developed his theoretical or 
experimental inquiries (Colman, 2006; Sudgen 
and Zamarròn, 2006).  
Schelling himself (2006) stresses that the 
analytical approach that he describes and applies 
in The Strategy of Conflict, as in his later works, 
has not yet been completely corroborated by 
further applications. Most recent works based on 
his theories have not developed his distinctive 
research approach. Game theorists have sought 
to include Schelling’ s ideas in the formal 
refinements of game theory (Gauthier, 1975; 
Sudgen, 1995; Janssen, 2001), and experimental 
applications have been conditioned by the need 
for perfectly controlled conditions in the 
experimental set up (Metha Starmer and Sugden, 
1990, 1994; Radner and Schotter, 1989; Roth, 
1985; Roth and Murnighan, 1982). But all these 
inquiries seem to forget the original purpose of 
Schelling’ s methodological choices: 
“ motivation for pure theory came almost 
exclusively from my preoccupation with (and 
fascination with) “ applied”  problems; and the 
clarification of theoretical ideas were absolutely 
dependent on an identification of live examples”  
(Schelling, 1993: 18). 
But perhaps something is about to change: the 
Nobel Prize’ s wishes seem to be picked out by 
Schotter’ s more recent works  in which he 
experimentally investigates the rise of social 
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conventions in intergenerational games (Merlo 
and Schotter, 1999, 2003;  Schotter, 2003; 
Schotter and Sopher, 2003).   
Schotter developed his interest in applied 
research during the 1970s when he undertook his 
first experimental work (Schotter, 2007). Since 
then, Schotter has grown increasingly aware that 
the refinements achieved by pure game theory 
contribute more to the philosophy of science than 
to economics. He maintains that economics 
needs tools with which to test theories and to 
understand real economic processes. Hence, his 
experimental research is based on strong 
theoretical hypotheses and uses the game theory 
framework to describe social interaction, but its 
aim is to investigate the processes through which 
agents make their decisions in social interaction. 
Schotter’ s experimental research therefore 
seems to accord with Schelling’ s 
methodological choices, and his analysis of the 
rise of social conventions could represent a step 
forward in the investigation of institution-creation 
processes.  
Nevertheless, the explanatory importance of a 
methodological approach that is a mixture of pure 
and applied theory has not yet been completely 
acknowledged by the profession. By focusing on 
the non-cooperative side, game theory has 
achieved great formal refinement and has 
become a normative theory of behavior (Aumann, 
1985). At the same time, experimental 
applications of game theory have often adhered 
to this mathematical refinement rather than 
considering game theory as simply a reasoning 
framework. The results arising from both 
Schelling’ s and Schotter’ s recent works 
suggest that there is still place to develop an 
interdisciplinary and experimental inquiry to 
understand the micro-foundations of institutions 
which encompasses both the relevance of 
cognitive determinants and the complexity of 
social interactions. 
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